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1. Introduction and background 
Armed conflicts and repressive regimes constitute a 
potential threat to the international community since they 
have spill-over effects, such as massive atrocities, 
migration of people, the expansion of terrorism, arms 
production and proliferation, drugs proliferation, 
organised crime, environmental damage, poverty, and 
lack of development, all of which have widespread effect. 
This threat makes it imperative to help states in such 
situations to undergo important political and social 
change so that they can build systems where the rule of 
law, democracy, and human rights protection can flourish. 
The achievement of these aims can also help to protect 
international peace and security. In such contexts, 
peacebuilding measures are necessary to achieve a 
lasting transformation, to avoid a relapse into conflict and 
repression. Without peacebuilding measures, states tend 
to relapse into conflict within five years of the signing of a 
peace agreement (Collier and Hoeffer, 2004). 
Peacebuilding encompasses peacekeeping –maintaining 
or enforcing peace, transitional justice, and other 
measures to prevent conflict and to provide security, 
stability, and prosperity (High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, 2004).   
 
This briefing paper focuses on transitional justice as one 
of the peacebuilding steps that needs to be taken to 
secure a stable democratic future. It aims to provide key 
stakeholders with an overview of transitional justice and 
its different components, while noting some of the key 
challenges faced by those working in this area. Since the 
field of transitional justice is very broad and complex, this 
paper focuses on its key concepts before addressing the 
main issues concerning its traditional components: 
justice, reparation, truth and institutional reform. The 
paper concludes with some remarks that challenge the 
traditional concept of transitional justice and its 
processes in order to initiate important debate on where 
future work in this field is needed. 
 
2. Key issues and problem areas 
Defining transitional justice 
 
The term transitional justice was coined in 1995, as a 
result of the publication of Transitional Justice: How 
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, 
edited by Kritz. Today, almost two decades later, the 
concept of transitional justice has influenced the legal, 
social and political discourse of societies undergoing 
fundamental social change, and that of the international 
community. The key assumption in such periods of 
change is that any state where mass atrocities have 
taken place should engage in processes (judicial and 
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non-judicial) that will achieve justice for past crimes, 
peace, a democratic society and an established rule of 
law. This assumption underpins the United Nations (UN) 
working definition of transitional justice. For the UN, 
transitional justice refers to “the full set of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society‟s attempts to 
come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuse, in 
order to secure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation” (Annan, 2004, p. 4). 
 
This definition, all-encompassing as it seems, leaves 
important issues unresolved, such as the relationship 
between international law and transitional justice; whether 
countries that move from authoritarian regimes towards 
democracy, but where gross human rights violations did 
not take place, should also engage with transitional 
justice processes; whether a transition can only take 
place in countries where conflict or oppression has 
ceased to exist; how to come to terms with large-scale 
past abuse; and what mechanisms should be used. Other 
definitions of transitional justice complement and enrich 
the UN one. Roht-Arriaza, for example, defines 
transitional justice as the “set of practices, mechanisms 
and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil 
strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at 
confronting and dealing with past violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law” (2006, p. 2). According to 
this concept, transitions can only take place when conflict 
or repression has ended and should include all human 
rights, not only civil and political rights. This concept is 
not broadly supported by stakeholders, some of whom 
prefer to limit it to serious and systematic violations of 
civil and political rights. Remarkably, however, the UN 
has moved towards recognising that to properly deal with 
the root causes of conflict it is also necessary to address 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights 
(OHCHR, 2009).  
 
There are yet other definitions that prefer to focus on the 
set of actors behind such processes, rather than on the 
substance of transitional justice. Arthur, for example, 
prefers to define transitional justice as a “field” constituted 
by “an international web of individuals and institutions, 
whose internal coherence is held together by common 
concepts, practical aims, and distinctive claims for 
legitimacy” (2009, p. 324), most of which are articulated 
as a result of the need to resist and respond to mass 
atrocities in contexts of significant political change. In 
contrast, others, like Bell, challenge the idea that 
transitional justice is a “field”, and prefer to think of it as a 
“label or cloak that aims to rationalize a set of diverse 
bargains in relation to the past as an integrated 
endeavour, so as to obscure the quite different normative, 
moral and political implications of the bargains” (2009, p. 
6).  For her, understanding transitional justice as a field 
denies its very nature as a legal enterprise that began as 
a response by human rights law to secure accountability 
for past crimes.  
 
Whether a field or not, and despite important differences 
among these concepts, they all highlight the fact that 
transitional justice implies a particular set of approaches 
to deal with the legacy of gross human rights violations 
and international crimes. Some of these approaches are 
driven by the international law paradigm, meaning 
international human rights law, international humanitarian 
law, international criminal law, and international refugee 
law, which becomes “the normative foundation” of 
transitional justice (OHCHR, 2009, and Annan, 2004, p. 
5). Nevertheless, approaches to transitional justice do not 
always follow this normative basis, as Bell clearly 
highlights, some maintain different normative approaches 
to some of the most important transitional justice 
questions, as will be illustrated below. 
 
The Processes of Transitional Justice 
 
Four processes are believed to constitute the core of 
transitional justice, even if there is disagreement about 
what each of them entails and the relationship that should 
exist between them. Usually, a transition encompasses a 
justice process, to bring perpetrators of mass atrocities to 
justice and to punish them for the crimes committed; a 
reparation process, to redress victims of atrocities for the 
harm suffered; a truth process, to fully investigate 
atrocities so that society discovers what happened during 
the repression/conflict, who committed the atrocities, and 
where the remains of the victims lie; and an institutional 
reform process, to ensure that such atrocities do not 
happen again (OHCHR, 2009). In addition to these core 
processes, others have become part of the transitional 
justice agenda: primarily, national consultations, which 
have been strongly recommended by the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the 
Peacebuilding Commission, which emphasise that 
“meaningful public participation” is essential for the 
success of any transition (A/HRC/12/18, 2009, and 
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A/63/881-S/2009/304, 2009). National consultations 
should take place in relation to different aspects of 
transitional justice. Finally, Disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration (DDR), which usually take place in 
parallel rather than as part of the transitional justice 
processes, actively interact with and complement 
transitional justice mechanisms and policies. DDR 
focuses on helping ex-combatants to stop fighting and to 
reintegrate into society (Waldorf, 2009). While all these 
processes are important, this report focuses on the core 
processes of transitional justice, namely: justice, 
reparation, truth and institutional reform. 
 
The Justice Process 
 
A key belief of transitional justice is that alleged 
perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes should be prosecuted, tried and, if found 
guilty, punished for the atrocities they committed. This 
approach is supported by three main arguments: a) that 
the international law paradigm obliges states to 
investigate, prosecute and punish such crimes; b) that 
adequate reparation under international law includes 
bringing perpetrators to account; and c) that 
accountability for past crimes is crucial to prevent such 
atrocities in the future.  
 
Important developments, both at the domestic and 
international level, and under International law strengthen 
legal arguments a) and b). Indeed, domestic trials are 
taking place in countries such as Argentina, Colombia 
and Chile, both as a response to victims‟ demands and in 
order to protect and enforce their rights, but also to 
comply with what the justice sector in these countries 
considers to be binding international obligations. For 
example, article IV of the 1948 UN Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
and article 4 of the 1984 UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment establish an international obligation in 
relation to genocide and torture, respectively. This 
obligation is claimed to have the status of customary 
international law in relation to such crimes 
. 
Equally, although human rights treaties, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, do not expressly 
incorporate such an obligation, all of them do expressly 
include the right to a remedy, which has been understood 
by their respective monitoring bodies to raise an 
obligation in relation to human rights violations, such as 
disappearances, torture and arbitrary killings (Orentlicher, 
1991). The key legal precedent for this approach is the 
judgment in Velázquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (1988), 
where the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
considered that “States must prevent, investigate and 
punish any violation of the rights recognized by the 
[American] Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt 
to restore the right violated and provide compensation as 
warranted for damages resulting from the violation” (para. 
166). Most of the treaties mentioned are also understood 
to require states to investigate crimes against humanity. 
 
Besides these sources of international human rights law, 
international criminal law has also developed in important 
ways to fight impunity. Ad hoc tribunals have been 
established by the Security Council to deal with the 
atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda (the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda). The Rome Statute establishing the 
International Criminal Court was agreed and entered into 
force in 2002. To-date, the Statute has 113 ratifications, 
almost twice what it had in 2002. It grants jurisdiction to 
the ICC over crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide, and aggression, also making individuals 
accountable for such crimes at the international level. 
Also, Hybrid tribunals have been established, such as the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Crime Panels of the 
District Court of Dili in East Timor, the War Crimes 
Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia. These developments all show an important 
domestic and international trend to fight impunity. This 
means that if states fail to fulfil their international 
obligation to make the perpetrators of such crimes 
accountable within their own jurisdictions, the 
international community can take action to ensure that 
justice is done. 
 
An important challenge to the justice element of 
transitional justice is the perception that it can be an 
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obstacle to peace, truth and/or reconciliation in the 
aftermath of conflict or repression. Those who support 
this view often claim that in such periods of change the 
international law paradigm is not applicable given the 
exceptional circumstances faced by states, or that 
international law does not fully rule out amnesties for past 
crimes, as is often believed (Mallinder, 2008). For them, 
peace (or any of the other goals mentioned) has to be 
sought first, even at the expense of justice. Therefore, 
amnesties (and also statutes of limitation) are an 
important necessity to allow a society to move forward, 
even if they potentially breach the obligation to 
investigate, prosecute and, if applicable, punish. For 
example, in the AZAPO case (1996), the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa maintained the constitutionality of 
the amnesty provision of the Promotion and National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995, based mainly on the 
view that the amnesty was essential as an incentive for 
perpetrators to confess their crimes. More recently, the 
Supreme Court of Brazil (2010) maintained that the 
amnesty law was necessary to consolidate peace and 
was the result of social consensus.  
 
At the international level, the tension between these 
objectives is also visible. The ICC, for example, is 
considered by some critics to be an obstacle to peace in 
countries where it is currently conducting investigations, 
for instance, in Uganda and Sudan. In Uganda, the ICC 
has initiated formal investigations of crimes committed by 
the Lord‟s Resistance Army in northern Uganda, and has 
issued arrest warrants. This has been strongly criticised, 
given the possible damage it could cause to the peace 
negotiations (Waddell and Clark, 2008). In Sudan, in 
2009, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against President 
Al Bashir, which was perceived as fuelling existing 
tensions there. 
 
Justice processes face other challenges that need urgent 
clarification and response. In relation to the existence of 
an international obligation to investigate, prosecute and, if 
applicable, punish, the following are pertinent questions 
in need of answers: assuming that this obligation exists, 
what is its scope (Mendez, 1997)?; is it sufficient to 
investigate and prosecute but not to punish?; should 
punishment be proportional to the gravity of the crimes 
committed?; how can the compliance of traditional justice 
mechanisms with international standards be measured?; 
and is there an international obligation to cooperate with 
countries undergoing a transition so that they are able to 
fulfil this international obligation? 
 
In relation to the role of law and social change: should 
justice be limited to retributive justice, or should it also 
incorporate issues of distributive justice? and, if so, how 
can distributive justice best be achieved? 
 
As for the fight against impunity and the delivery justice: 
how can evidence be secured to facilitate the course of 
retributive justice?; how can evidence be secured that not 
only explains the circumstances of the crimes but that also 
helps to identify the perpetrators?; how can effective victim 
and witness protection mechanisms be created (OHCHR, 
2009)?; how can international cooperation between states 
be secured, so that the perpetrators of crimes can be 
prosecuted and punished?; how can the evidence of 
crimes be preserved and shared? and how can the 
required expertise and capacity to conduct complex 
investigations and prosecutions be ensured in fragile 
countries with fragile institutions?  
 
The majority of these questions are in the process of being 
addressed, but more comparative, multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary studies are needed to highlight both the 
problems and the achievements of the domestic and 
international justice processes that have already been put 
into motion worldwide. 
 
Lastly, but not less importantly, the causal connection 
claimed to exist between justice and prevention is still to 
be proven, despite the way this connection (and, 
specifically, any deterrence effect of justice mechanisms) 
is asserted by international law in treaties such as the 
Genocide Convention or the Torture Convention, and by 
international organisations like the UN. To date, the most 
prominent quantitative work in this area has been that of 
Kim and Sikkink (2007), who suggest that, overall, such 
trials help to improve human rights protection in countries 
undergoing transitions and even in neighbouring countries. 
Their research stands in clear contrast with that of others 
like Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003 and 2004), who 
maintained that, rather than preventing future violations, 
such trials can cause further atrocities. Clearly, since 
transitional justice processes take time, even more than 
one generation, it is not easy to measure the impact that 
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domestic or international trials can have on prevention. 
Nevertheless, it is important to conduct further research 
in this area to better ground any justification for retributive 
justice as a means of preventing further atrocities. 
 
The reparation process 
 
Transitional justice is also based on the assumption that 
gross human rights violations cause serious harm to its 
victims and should therefore be redressed. This 
assumption is widely upheld in relation to state 
responsibility and in relation to individual criminal 
responsibility. Firstly, under international law, any state 
that breaches its international obligations (by action or 
omission) has the obligation to produce reparation 
(International Law Commission, 2001). So, for example, 
when states are involved in the commission of human 
rights violations (like disappearances or torture), as 
happened, for example, in Chile and Argentina during 
their respective dictatorships, the state is liable under 
international law to produce reparations for its victims if, 
at the time of the commission of such atrocities, it was 
bound by international law (treaty and/or custom) not to 
commit such violations. Secondly, international law also 
recognises individual criminal responsibility for crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, genocide and aggression. 
Perpetrators of such crimes should also repair the harm 
they caused to their victims (Rome Statute, article 75). 
These two forms of reparation (state and individual) are 
well founded in international law. 
 
These scenarios leave unaddressed other actors who in 
certain cases are also alleged to have participated in the 
commission of atrocities. The Khulumani case is 
emblematic in this sense. In this case, it is alleged that 
five corporations aided and abetted in the commission of 
apartheid in South Africa. The case against the 
corporations is currently being litigated under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act in the United States. The problem faced 
by such litigation is that the international law paradigm, 
the normative foundation of transitional justice, has not 
evolved to the point of making transnational corporations 
or financial institutions accountable for gross human 
rights violations or international crimes. This, however, 
does not mean that they are beyond the law, since they 
might also be liable under the domestic law of the 
relevant jurisdiction where the crime was committed, or 
where the company has its headquarters. Nevertheless, 
there are other legal hurdles that need to be surpassed; 
for example, the narrow interpretation of “aiding and 
abetting”. This is one of the areas where more research is 
needed, given that such actors could play an important 
role in redressing harm and in helping a society to move 
forward.  
 
It is also common to see states engaging on a 
reparations process without acknowledging any legal 
responsibility for the human rights violations or crimes 
that were committed, but rather appearing to act in order 
to help their own people or others to move forward. In 
Colombia, for example, the government established the 
Programa de Reparación Individual por Via 
Administrativa (Administrative Reparations Programme) 
so that the state could provide reparations to victims of 
crimes (such as disappearances, torture, and arbitrary 
killings) committed by the guerrillas or paramilitary groups 
(not state forces) before 22 April 2008.  
 
On other occasions, states other than the states where 
the atrocities were committed also contribute to the 
reparations process, not because they acknowledge the 
existence of an international obligation to this end but 
because they decide to cooperate with such a process. 
For example, the United States, through USAID, helped 
to finance the comprehensive health programme created 
for the victims (Lira, 2005), known as PRAIS (Programa 
de Reparación y Ayuda Integral en Salud y Derechos) in 
Chile. 
 
Although there is a consensus that there is a legal 
foundation to claim reparations under international law, 
both from states and individuals, the standard required is 
that of “adequate reparation” and this standard is yet to 
be fleshed out. Clearly, reparations have the primary aim 
of returning the status quo ante. In periods of transitional 
justice this is almost impossible, given the nature of the 
violations that have been committed. Equally, reparations 
should be proportional to the harm suffered. Important 
guidelines have been agreed by states, such as the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (UN General-Assembly, 2005), which 
indicate important principles to regulate reparations by 
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the state in such situations. They also list different forms 
of reparation, such as restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition as possible complementary forms of redress. 
The Rome Statute indicates that the Court should 
establish the principles of reparations to be applied to the 
perpetrators of crimes under its jurisdiction, and that they 
include restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. 
Nevertheless, how to effectively provide adequate 
reparation using these forms of redress remains a 
complex matter, and one to which there is not yet an 
appropriate answer. Some consensus exists to support 
the idea that adequate reparation in such situations 
includes the investigation and prosecution of those who 
committed the crime(s), but that it should also include a 
combination of other forms of reparation given the 
seriousness of the violation, while bearing in mind the 
particular situation of each victim. 
 
However, several complex issues remain to be clarified, 
such as: how to guarantee that victims receive adequate 
reparation; how to make the reparation paid by the state 
and the perpetrator compatible, so that one complements 
the other; what constitutes adequate compensation for a 
disappearance, torture or genocide (Sandoval and 
Duttwiler, 2010); how harm can be quantified in economic 
terms; the scope of rehabilitation, and whether it only 
relates to providing the victim with physical and mental 
care, or whether it goes beyond this to include other 
services (Sandoval, 2009); what should happen when the 
perpetrator is indigent; how to enforce and monitor 
compliance with reparation orders; and how to avoid 
payments by the state and the perpetrator for reparation 
causing undue enrichment to the victim. 
 
Intrinsically related to the question of what constitutes 
adequate reparation under international law is the 
question of who counts as a victim of such atrocities. 
Thanks to important changes during recent years, today, 
there seems to be more recognition that the victims of 
crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide, for 
example, include not only those who are directly attacked 
(the person who is killed, tortured or disappeared) but 
others, notably, family members, who can also be 
harmed in such situations (Sandoval, 2009).  
 
Despite this broad consensus, transitions take place in 
countries where a significant number of the population 
has been targeted and has suffered as a result. Consider 
the case of Rwanda, where 800,000 people 
(approximately 10% of the total population) were killed 
within 100 days in 1994 (Commission of Enquiry, 1999). 
Are the victims only the 800,000 that were killed? Should 
their surviving family, friends, and the communities they 
lived in be included? Are those who witnessed the 
genocide victims? How can all the victims be identified 
and recognised by the law as entitled to reparations? 
How can adequate reparations be made when Rwanda 
was left bankrupt after the genocide? What about 
reparations for refugees or people who are in exile? Do 
women and children require special reparation 
measures? Is it better to provide collective reparations, 
relying more on rehabilitation, satisfaction measures and 
guarantees of non-repetition for the communities, than to 
provide individual compensation and other forms of 
reparation? How can collective harm and individual harm 
be best balanced and reparations made accordingly? 
 
An additional challenge when considering reparation 
relates to who can order reparations and how such 
systems can be made consistent. Broadly speaking, there 
are two distinct ways of achieving this: firstly, a judgment 
by a domestic Court, an international tribunal (human 
rights tribunal or criminal court, like the ICC or the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia), or a 
truth and reconciliation commission –depending on their 
mandate, and/or, secondly, administrative reparation 
programmes (Rubio, Sandoval and Diaz, 2009). One 
does not necessarily exclude the other, but the former 
aim to deal with reparations for the individual victims in a 
particular case, while the latter do not consider the 
individual harm suffered by each victim but rather applies 
the same treatment to all victims who suffered, for 
example, torture. These systems can be challenged on 
grounds of fairness. States create their own 
administrative reparations programmes to respond to the 
harm suffered by victims of disappearances, arbitrary 
killings and torture, for example. These programmes aim 
to benefit thousands of persons who qualify for 
reparations. However, is it possible to say that such 
reparation measures are adequate when they do not take 
into account the particular characteristics of each victim? 
Equally complex is the question of how to deal with 
reparations awarded by the administrative reparations 
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programme when, at the same time, some victims also 
seek judicial protection at the national or international 
level and, as a result, could end up getting more 
reparation than other victims who suffered equally.  
 
Reparations to victims have also generated important 
discussion regarding their transformative potential. Given 
that victims of heinous crimes are usually discriminated 
against and poor, reparations can be seen as a means to 
move towards development and to challenge structures 
of discrimination that can be left unaltered if the aim of 
reparation is simply to return the victim to the status quo 
ante (Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky, 2009). This potential 
reach of reparations has, as a consequence, helped to 
challenge the traditional understanding of transitional 
justice, one that is limited to the achievement of justice –
retributive justice- for past atrocities, rather than one that 
encompasses the achievement of distributive justice. 
Nevertheless, there is no consensus around the 
extension of the concept of transitional justice to include 
tackling the root causes of conflict or repression, or to 
intrinsically link it with development or with the fulfilment 
of economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
The truth process 
 
Transitional justice processes are also built on the belief 
that individual victims and their societies need to know 
what happened. As Roht-Arriaza (2006) indicates, since 
most of the atrocities committed in periods of repression 
or conflict happen in secrecy or denial, there is an 
inherent need to clarify what happened and who was 
responsible. This finds strong support in international law, 
at least in relation to certain crimes, such as 
disappearances. For example, Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions indicates, in articles 32, 33 and 34, that 
families of missing persons have the right to know the 
fate of their loved ones and it establishes the obligations 
to be fulfilled by each party to the conflict. Equally, the UN 
Convention on the Protection of all Persons from 
Enforced Disappearances, not yet in force, establishes, in 
article 24, the right of victims to “know the truth regarding 
the circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the 
progress and results of the investigation and the fate of 
the disappeared person”. The UN Working Group on 
Disappearances has recently confirmed the existence of 
this right under international law, and not only in relation 
to disappearances (General Comment, 2010). 
Despite the legal recognition of this right in relation to 
disappearances, it continues to be disputed in relation to 
other gross human rights violations since there is no 
express legal recognition of such right. Nevertheless, it 
could be argued that important state practice and opinio 
juris exists, so it could be said that there is a customary 
rule to that effect. Even if it is accepted that the right to 
know the truth exists under international law, there 
continues to be a dispute as to who its right-holder is. Is it 
the victims of gross human rights violations or is it society 
as a whole, or both of them? Further, what is the scope of 
such a right? and what are states obliged to do? 
International tribunals, like the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, have argued that there is no autonomous 
right to know the truth under the American Convention on 
Human Rights but, rather, that the right to know the truth 
is equivalent, or is “subsumed in the right of victims and 
families to obtain clarification of the facts through judicial 
investigation and adjudication” (Cassel, 2007, p. 160) in 
relation to any kind of gross human rights violation. This 
only reinforces elements of the justice dimension already 
explained, since the only way to fulfil the right to know the 
truth is if the state complies with its obligation to 
investigate, prosecute and, if applicable, punish 
perpetrators of such atrocious crimes. 
 
Beyond the existing possibility to enforce the right to 
know the truth before a Court, other mechanisms have 
been used to this effect, which can achieve a more 
comprehensive reconstruction of the past than that which 
can be achieved judicially. The most common way to deal 
with the truth of past atrocities is through a truth and 
reconciliation commission (TRC). A TRC is a commission 
of enquiry created by the state (usually the executive or 
parliament) to investigate heinous crimes committed 
during conflict or repression and to produce 
recommendations for dealing with the consequences 
(Freeman, 2006). The mandates of TRCs are very 
diverse. For example, the famous South African TRC had 
the power to investigate crimes committed during 
apartheid, including the use of subpoena and seizure 
powers, to have public hearings, and to recommend the 
granting of an amnesty for perpetrators in exchange for 
full disclosure. This commission was also allowed to 
award interim reparations and to make recommendations 
in this respect. In contrast, the Argentinean National 
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Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP) was 
mandated only to investigate the disappearances that 
took place in the country between 1976 and 1983, without 
subpoena or seizure powers. 
 
While the three processes described so far (justice, 
reparation and truth) are clearly connected, there can be 
tension between them. In Sierra Leone, for example, a 
TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone were 
established to deal with the legacy of mass atrocities. 
Tensions between the two bodies were visible, for 
example, in relation to the amnesty included in the Lomé 
agreement. The TRC upheld the amnesty, since it was 
approved by negotiators of the agreement and because it 
was the only way to stop the conflict. The Special Court, 
however, which considered the amnesty contrary to 
international law (Schabas, 2006). A similar problem 
arose, as Schabas notes, in relation to the exchange of 
information between the two bodies and the possibility 
that alleged perpetrators, who were prosecuted by the 
Special Court, would appear before the TRC at a public 
hearing. Such tensions call for a more concerted effort 
towards building transitional mechanisms that operate 
more harmoniously and that complement each other. 
They also highlight the need to consider when and in 
which order it is best to deploy each process, since 
sequencing them could also be an option (Fletcher et al., 
2009). The order of such a sequence remains a question 
subject to debate. 
 
The work of TRCs faces other important challenges. First, 
how the truth can best be reconstructed when human and 
financial resources are limited, and mandates restrict 
their reach (for example, to clarify only gross human 
rights violations, but not the root causes of a conflict). 
Second, as Freeman notes, TRCs also require the 
adoption of clear legal procedures, to deal with the truth 
revealed (Freeman, 2006). Third, to be successful TRCs 
need important outreach policies and structures, so that 
all victims can tell their stories and participate actively in 
the process of social change and truth building. 
Otherwise, TRCs can be criticised for being unable to 
achieve their goal of truth seeking. Fourth, TRC reports 
need to be widely disseminated to build a common 
narrative of what happened and why, and to eradicate 
inaccurate preconceptions. In this way, TRCs play a 
crucial role in returning dignity to victims in the eyes of 
the societies to which they belong. Finally, it is essential 
that there is implementation of and follow up to the 
recommendations of TRCs by the government and state 
authorities to prevent further heinous crimes and to help 
the state to move towards reconciliation and peace 
(OHCHR, truth commissions, 2006).  
  
The process of institutional reform 
 
Reforming state institutions involved in, or that failed to 
prevent, the commission of heinous crimes is an 
essential element of the transitional justice processes. 
Without the reform of institutions, transitional justice 
would be unable to prevent such crimes and human 
rights violations from occurring again (OHCHR, 2006). 
Institutional reform is closely linked to guarantees of 
non-repetition (reparations process), an obligation 
required from states that have breached international 
obligations by the international community as an 
assurance that what happened will not happen again. 
The key concern of such measures is prevention 
(International Law Commission, 2001).  
 
In processes of transition, states are dealing with the 
atrocities that were committed but also with the 
structures that made them possible. Therefore, in order 
to prevent their recurrence it is essential to identify and 
transform such structures. In particular, but not 
exclusively, the process of institutional reform aims to 
transform the security sector and the justice sector. 
Security sector refers to “the structures, institutions and 
personnel responsible for the management, provision 
and oversight of security in a country” (UN Secretary-
General, A/62/659–S/2008/39, 2008). It includes the 
police, military personnel, intelligence services, customs, 
certain segments of the justice sector, and non-state 
actors with security functions. Since the justice sector is 
not fully included in this concept, it is also an element of 
institutional reform that should be at the heart of 
transitional justice processes. Indeed, one of the key 
aims of transitional justice, from a human rights 
perspective, is to bring to account those who are 
responsible for the atrocities and, to this end, both the 
security and justice sectors are essential. If they are not 
up to the challenge, impunity and corruption will prevail. 
The OECD prefers to refer to “security system” to have a 
more encompassing concept that integrates the security 
and justice sectors, but that also includes prison reform, 
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democratic oversight and accountability, and civil society, 
and others (OECD DAC, 2007).  
 
Security sector or system reform happens not only in 
processes of transition (Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, 2009). 
Yet, such reform in a process of transitional justice aims, 
in particular, to transform the culture and structure that 
allowed the commission of such atrocious crimes, as well 
as to (re)build fragile or non-existing institutions. One of 
the biggest challenges faced in such transitions is the 
reconstruction of society‟s trust in the security system. 
Therefore, different measures are needed that are 
complex and context dependent. The OECD and the UN 
consider it essential to carry out a proper assessment of 
the structures that made such violations possible, in order 
to identify problems and suitable measures. Besides this, 
common institutional reforms include vetting, meaning the 
“processes for assessing an individual‟s integrity as a 
means for determining his or her suitability for public 
employment” (Duthie, 2007). If an individual lacks 
integrity -lack of respect for human rights- they should be 
removed from their jobs or not be appointed to any public 
position. Equally, clear rules should be enacted, from 
constitutional and legislative norms to the enactment of 
codes of conduct, to regulate wrongful behaviour. Also, 
both disciplinary and criminal procedures should be 
established to deal with irregularities and impunity (Davis, 
2009). Furthermore, adequate educational training of 
security sector and justice sector personnel is essential, 
to ensure they understand the rights of all individuals, that 
certain conducts are forbidden, and that a culture of 
impunity will not be tolerated. Particular attention should 
be given to generate awareness of the way such crimes 
affect different members of society and, in particular, 
women, and of the obligation they have to act in a 
gender-sensitive way. 
 
Institutional reform faces various challenges in processes of 
transition. Firstly, lack of political will to carry out the 
political/structural reforms necessary where the reform 
might also entail accountability. Second, while the 
international community participates actively in such 
processes through international cooperation and 
assistance, it is not always in a consistent and harmonious 
way, this can reduce the effectiveness of reforms, and 
opportunities for much-needed reform can be missed. 
Thirdly, important opportunities for local capacity building, 
as well as for local ownership of the reform process, can 
also be missed (OECD DAC, 2007).    
 
Conclusions 
 
Helping a state to deal with the legacy of mass atrocities in 
a period of change is a complex task. Transitional justice 
has emerged as a possible response to the difficult 
dilemmas it generates. It is a way to articulate the different 
processes considered necessary to help a society move 
from a period of repression and/or conflict, where mass 
atrocities took place, to one in which human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law can prevail. Nevertheless, 
transitional justice processes have usually dismissed the 
root causes of conflict making it even harder to achieve its 
aims. 
 
Furthermore, despite the fast development of transitional 
justice as a field and of the processes described, such 
mechanisms are not always based on consistent normative 
foundations, simply because in periods of radical change 
different political forces and goals can be incompatible 
(Bell, 2009). Also, the goals of each individual process 
(truth, justice, reparations and institutional reform) are not 
always achievable in parallel.  
 
The paradigm of international law aims to provide some 
coherence to the delivery of such processes and to reduce 
the incidence of political tension by dictating what ought to 
be done. However, as was seen with the right to know the 
truth, or with the obligation to investigate, prosecute and, if 
applicable, punish, the status of such rights and their scope 
continues to be the subject of great debate. Further, 
international law is not constituted by a set of infallibly clear, 
consistent and compatible norms of law, adding challenges 
to the way laws, such as international criminal law, 
international human rights law, international humanitarian 
law, and international refugee law, regulate and interact 
with one another in such periods of transition. 
 
Equally important to note is that transitional justice is a 
state-centred approach. It is built and constructed around 
the belief that a consistent response should be articulated 
in the territory of the state where the atrocities occurred 
and, also, that the root causes of such atrocities exist within 
the borders of a particular state. While these assumptions 
remain true for some aspects of transitional justice, the 
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close interaction between states and other important 
international actors, and between people across borders, 
calls for a more comprehensive approach to truth, justice, 
reparations and institutional reform that can transcend 
state boundaries. 
 
For example, transitional justice processes should include, 
in a satisfactory manner, people in exile and refugees. 
Also, other states or non-state actors also responsible for 
atrocities should recognise their mistakes and assume 
responsibility for what happened. International justice 
helps to achieve this aim, although in a limited way. Yet, 
truth remains a local business when the UN, other states 
and other actors could play an important role in truth-
seeking and truth telling, beyond providing economic or 
expert support. For instance, the UN report on its 
independent inquiry into its role during the 1994 genocide 
in Rwanda is a step in the right direction (Commission of 
Enquiry, 1999). It also clarifies the role and responsibility 
that others had during the genocide. 
 
Equally crucial is the recognition that transitional actors go 
beyond the state, demobilised groups and the military. 
Indeed, transitional justice processes are conducted by 
diverse actors that need to figure more openly and visibly 
in them, such as regional human rights courts (as opposed 
to criminal tribunals); local or traditional courts, such as the 
gacaca; international cooperation agencies; non-
governmental organisations (local and international); and 
transnational corporations (Sandoval, 2008). 
 
Transitional justice processes also require significant 
economic resources. States undergoing transition do not 
have sufficient resources and, as a result, are highly 
dependent on contributions from the international 
community, via the UN or other regional organisations, or 
on bilateral contributions. Therefore, work between donors 
and between those providing technical assistance is 
crucial to enhance the results and possible impact of 
transitional justice processes. In connection to this, 
transitional justice should be considered vis à vis other 
peacebuilding and development measures, and economic 
and human resources should be allocated accordingly. 
The aims of transitional justice, at least from an 
international law point of view, cannot be achieved if the 
different mechanisms explained here are not well 
resourced and are not treated as priorities in the 
peacebuilding agenda. Therefore, a more open discussion 
and an exchange of experiences are required between 
different peacebuilding initiatives, such as, transitional 
justice and DDR.  
 
Finally, even though it is premature to assess the degree 
of success of such processes, it is important to continue to 
document case-studies (in all relevant areas of transitional 
justice) in order to gather relevant evidence that could help 
to adequately answer the many questions identified in this 
report, which require urgent response. While international 
law should remain the normative basis of such processes, 
its success remains highly dependent on the capacity of 
other disciplines to work with the law to enrich its delivery 
in relation to justice, truth, reparations and institutional 
reform.   
Notes 
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